Asset Protection BLOG - Mark Nestmann

Why Data Mining for Terrorists Will Never Work

Through initiatives such as "Secure Flight," the U.S. government assures us that data mining makes us safe from terrorists. 

Under this initiative, you won't be able to obtain a boarding pass for a flight to, from, or within the United States unless you receive permission to travel from the Transportation Security Administration.

But the government is lying to us.  Data mining will never be effective to identify terrorists.

Here's why:

Data mining analysis defines how an individual fits into a group, and predicts that person's behavior based on characteristics of that group. 

For instance, under Secure Flight, the TSA will analyze your credit records, your travel history, your bank records, your credit card records, your telephone records, your Web surfing records, and many other types of records to determine if you pose a terrorist threat. 

If you "pass" the TSA analysis, you'll receive a boarding pass.  If you don't, you won't be able to travel by air, even within the United States.

There's only one problem, other than the giving the government carte blanche over our personal data, with zero accountability for its misuse.  Data mining for terrorists doesn't work.  And it never will.

Terrorists don't fit an easily identifiable profile.  While most terrorists are male and under 40, nearly two billion people fit this profile worldwide.  There are also an exceedingly small number of actual terrorists, and they deliberately obscure their trail to avoid detection. 

These factors make data mining to identify terrorism an expensive waste of time.  One analysis by security expert Bruce Schneier estimated that even with 99.9% accuracy, data mining for terrorists would generate one billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. 

For some applications, though, data mining does work.  It works best when there's a well-defined profile of whatever you're searching for, a substantial number of "events," and minimal consequences for "false positives."

An example of an effective application for data mining is credit card fraud.  All credit card companies now data mine their transaction databases, looking for patterns of spending that might indicate a stolen card. 

Since a credit card thief generally purchases a large number of expensive items shortly after the theft, it's possible to identify fraud with a high degree of accuracy.  The consequence of a false positive—mistakenly identifying a credit card as stolen—is that the legitimate owner temporarily can't use it.  But this is a problem only until the rightful owner contacts the credit card issuer to inform them of the mistake. 

The federal government surely knows these facts.  Yet, it persists in claiming that data mining will somehow help identify terrorists.  Why?   

It turns out that looking for other types of people who are not as rare as terrorists is much more plausible using data mining technologies.  For instance, lots of people don't approve of the way the government is fighting the so-called War on Terrorism.  Some of these people may subscribe to publications that criticize the War on Terrorism; make phone calls to other people who don't like it, etc.  Since all of these records are "mined" by various federal agencies, it would be easy for the government to use this information to identify opponents of this war.

In other words, while data mining is almost useless for identifying terrorists, it's an effective way for the government to engage in political intelligence gathering.  And that's how I think it's being used.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

The Computer Found You Guilty…How Do You Plead?

Your bank or broker will never tell you, but every transaction you conduct through a US bank or broker--deposits, withdrawals, credit card, currency conversion –creates a secret financial profile of YOU.

The USA PATRIOT Act and similar laws actually require banks, brokers, car dealerships, jewelers, and many other types of businesses to spy on you.  And none of these businesses are allowed to tell you they're doing it. 

If the computer software these businesses MUST use to spy on you triggers a "guilty account" alert, you'll never know until your assets are frozen or confiscated.  The law makes it a crime to tell you if you're under suspicion.

One mistake—withdrawing too much cash, writing a check to the "wrong" person, etc.—and you could be the next victim.

The all-new third edition of THE LIFEBOAT STRATEGY, updated in October 2007, can help protect you from having an innocent transaction from being deemed "suspicious," and deal with hundreds of other threats to your wealth and privacy. 

To learn more about THE LIFEBOAT STRATEGY, click here.

If you purchased any version of THE LIFEBOAT STRATEGY after October 1, 2006, you're eligible for a free update for the electronic version of this report.  If you haven't already received instructions on how to obtain this update, please send proof that you purchased the report AFTER OCTOBER 1, 2006 (e.g., billing receipt, canceled check, etc.) by postal mail or e-mail to:

The Nestmann Group, Ltd.
2303 N. 44th St #14-1025
Phoenix, AZ 85008 USA
info@nestmann.com

When we receive this information, we'll e-mail you a link to the free electronic update.  PLEASE INCLUDE YOUR E-MAIL ADDRESS SO THAT WE MAY SEND YOU THE LINK.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

The Lazy Person's Path to Revenge: Call Your Enemy a "Terrorist"

Itching for revenge on your business competitor, raucous neighbors, or mother-in-law?  Just tell the FBI or other police agency your enemy is a terrorist, sit back, and savor the results.

That's what recently happened to a man in Sweden traveling to the United States  The man's father-in-law was angry with him for divorcing his daughter.  When the man had to travel on business to the United States, the father sent an e-mail message to the FBI accusing his son-in-law of having links to al-Qaeda.

Upon his arrival in Florida, authorities arrested the son-in-law.  Police handcuffed him, placed him in a detention cell, and interrogated him for 11 hours.  Police finally convinced themselves the man wasn't a threat to U.S. national security.  But even then, authorities refused to allow the man to enter the United States.  He was unceremoniously expelled and placed on a flight back to Europe.

Confronted by Swedish authorities for sending a libelous e-mail, the father-in-law admitted playing a dirty trick.  He said he didn't think, "the authorities were so stupid that they would believe anything.  But apparently they are."

If accusing your enemy of being a terrorist isn't enough, you need to think bigger.  Think money laundering.  Simply accuse your enemy of laundering money for terrorists. 

That's what happened to Naresh Goyal, the founder and chairman of Jet Airways, India's biggest private airline.  In 2005, Jet applied for a license to fly to the United States.  After a series of delays, Mr. Goyal learned that he was suspected of laundering money for al-Qaeda.  Later, he learned that local competitors were behind the claim.

After a two-year investigation, U.S. authorities approved Jet's application for U.S. landing rights.  But Goyal holds no grudge against his accusers.  “Indians are very creative,” he says. 

And that's the best way to get your revenge.  Simply be creative.  Yes, it's illegal to make false accusations against your enemy or competitor.  And, yes, it might get you into trouble.  But, that apparently hasn't stopped many people from making false accusations.

The bigger question, of course, is what happens after the FBI or other police agency completes its investigation.  I suspect that the Swedish man interrogated and denied entry into the United States is now on the government's terrorist screening database.  Mr. Goyal may be a proud member as well.

Nor is getting off the watchlist easy.  Even dead people can't get off of it.  Saddam Hussein, executed in 2006, apparently remains on the watchlist.  The watchlist also reportedly contains the names of several of the Sept. 11, 2001 hijackers killed in the attacks of that day. 

In other words, if you finger someone as a terrorist, the likely result is that wherever they travel, for years if not decades to come, they'll experience delays, detentions, and possible denial of entry rights.  Sweet revenge indeed, for their false accusers.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

Hushmail Eavesdrops on Users

Last week, I described here how U.S. investigators forced Hushmail, a leading provider of e-mail privacy solutions, to divulge copies of decrypted, "plain text" e-mail messages.

At the time, it appeared that only one form of the encryption Hushmail uses was compromised.  But I've now learned that the company has developed techniques to eavesdrop on all users, albeit only in response to a valid court order.

A little background: in 1999, Hushmail, based in British Columbia, Canada, introduced a revolutionary service to make sending and receiving encrypted e-mail easier and faster.  Hushmail allows users to send and receive encrypted e-mail messages through a Web-based interface similar to Yahoo! or Hotmail e-mail.

The original—and supposedly surveillance-proof—encryption "engine" works by sending your PC a Java "applet" that performs the encryption.  Since the encryption occurs on your PC, Hushmail supposedly has no access to unencrypted messages.  Indeed, Hushmail promoted this capability by stating:

… Not even a Hushmail employee with access to our servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer."

Loading a Java "applet" takes a few seconds and delays access to a Hushmail account.  Some Hushmail users didn't want to wait.  So, in 2006, Hushmail developed a service that didn't require the applet.  In this service, encryption occurs in Hushmail's own servers, not in your PC.  This introduced an obvious vulnerability, which Hushmail confirmed earlier this month.  The company announced that in response to a Canadian court order, it had turned over 12 CDs worth of plain-text e-mail messages to U.S. investigators.

It now appears that Hushmail can send a "poisoned" applet to subscribers using the original, Java-based service.  That applet sends the targeted user's passphrase back to Hushmail, thus giving investigators access to the "plain text" of all stored e-mails and any future e-mail sent or received.  Again, this evidently occurs only after Hushmail receives a valid court order requiring it to turn over plain text messages from a targeted account.

According to Brian Smith, Hushmail's Chief Technology Officer, "The extra security given by the Java applet is not particularly relevant, in the practical sense, if an individual account is targeted."

Hushmail remains preferable to the alternative followed by 99.9% of e-mail users—sending unencrypted messages in "plain text."  Reading these messages is remarkably simple.  E-mail also has less legal protection than telephone calls, particularly with regard to messages stored in a Web based system.

However, if you're seeking stronger protection, encryption programs you install on your PC, such as PGP, are superior to Hushmail.  PGP isn't immune to attacks (e.g., an investigator might plant "Trojan Horse" software to steal your encryption keys and passphrase), but, properly used, it offers an extremely high level of security. 

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann, LL.M.

The "Good Guys" at the IRS

Today, I'm going to say something nice about the IRS.  Really!

Thousands of Americans have tax reporting obligations they don't know about for various offshore transactions.  Among the most common of these are unreported interests in particular, foreign corporations.

Forming a foreign corporation is one of those things that, at first glance, would appear not to raise an IRS reporting obligation.

After all, simply buying shares in a foreign corporation doesn't generally create such an obligation.  For instance, if you buy shares of Bayer on the Frankfurt exchange, your only reporting obligation is to let the IRS know when you receive a dividend, or sell the shares for a capital gain.  (However, if you purchase the shares through a foreign bank account, you must report the existence of the account.) 

Logically speaking, wouldn't the same treatment apply to shares of your own foreign corporation?  The answer, unfortunately, is in many cases "no." 

In virtually all cases in which Americans form a foreign corporation to hold assets that generate passive income, they become entangled in the "controlled foreign corporation" or "CFC" rules.

These extremely complex regulations exist to prevent U.S.-based multi-national corporations from diverting profits into foreign subsidiaries, where they can be tax deferred indefinitely. 

If U.S. shareholders own 50% or more of the shares in a foreign corporation (e.g., an international business company or IBC), by vote or value, the foreign corporation is a CFC.  U.S. shareholders are defined as U.S. natural persons, partnerships, corporations, trusts, and estates that own, respectively, 10% or greater interests in the foreign corporation. 

Anyone defined as a U.S. shareholder in a CFC is required to file an extremely complex information return each year with the IRS—Form 5471. 

What's more, if the CFC holds passive assets, the income generated is currently taxable to the U.S. shareholder.  The income need not be distributed as a dividend to be taxable.

Problem is, the offshore companies that form foreign corporations for Americans know little or nothing about U.S. reporting obligations.  Many of them simply tell their U.S. clients what seems obvious—that no reporting obligation exists until the client sells the shares or the corporation issues a dividend. 

Bad advice.  A U.S. shareholder who fails to file Form 5471 when required is subject to a US$10,000 civil penalty.  Harsher penalties, including possible imprisonment, may also apply in aggravated circumstances. 

This situation may also apply to wealthy immigrants who own a foreign business "back home."  They go to a U.S. tax advisor who knows nothing about international tax law.  The advisor tells them that since the foreign business files taxes "back home," it has no U.S. tax obligations. 

Again, bad advice.  While it's true that the company itself may have no U.S. tax obligations, it's now-U.S. shareholders may well need to file Form 5471. 

And here's where the IRS has played "Mr. Nice Guy."  Well, at least a little.

I recently received correspondence from a CPA specializing in international tax compliance who says he files more than 30 delinquent Form 5471s each year.  And not one of these clients has ever been subjected to the US$10,000 civil penalty. 

There are no guarantees, of course.  But especially if the foreign corporation didn't generate any income taxable to its U.S. shareholders, it seems the IRS generally won't impose a penalty. 

If you're a U.S. shareholder in a foreign corporation with delinquent reporting obligations, this is very good news indeed.  You should still obtain professional tax advice before you file the delinquent returns.  But absent aggravating circumstances, the IRS probably won't fine you for this lapse.

Thanks, IRS.

On December 7, 2007, I'll be attending a CFC "boot camp" in Las Vegas designed to shed some clarity on these complex rules.  It's intended to provide a non-technical briefing on CFCs, along with creative ways to avoid CFC tax traps, and will be taught by leading experts in the field of international tax. 

For more information on this event, click here.  Hope to see you there!

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann, LL.M.

Asset Protection: Don't Jump From the Frying Pan Into the Fire

It's only prudent to take move some of your wealth outside your home country.

By doing so, you can reduce the vulnerability of that wealth to lawsuits and other legal threats.  You may also obtain greater privacy, access to investment opportunities not available in your own country, along with other benefits.

It's important, though, to choose the right offshore jurisdiction.  Some of the jurisdictions I recommend include Austria, Switzerland, and Nevis.  All these countries have a substantial legal framework for protecting wealth. 

More importantly, this legal framework is consistent with the way things actually operate in the country. The laws don't say one thing, while the government actually pursues a very different course.

Unfortunately, the same can't be said for some competing jurisdictions.  A case in point is Antigua, a former U.K. colony that's been independent since 1981.

Officially known as Antigua & Barbuda, the nation comprises two separate islands forming one country.  Located in the Eastern Caribbean, Antigua has struggled since independence to achieve financial self-sufficiency.

Tourism is by far the largest source of revenue, but like many of its Caribbean neighbors, Antigua has developed itself into an offshore center.  Recently, the lower chamber of the Antiguan Parliament enacted enabling or revised legislation for offshore trusts, offshore foundations, and offshore LLCs.  The laws are said to create "the world's most secure and confidential environment for international asset protection, wealth preservation and tax minimization."

That may well be the case.  But unfortunately, Antigua's reputation as an asset haven doesn't live up to its "black letter law."

In a previous blog entry, I described how the government of Antigua confiscated the Half Moon Bay Resort from its rightful owners, without paying compensation.   I also described how in 2001, the government tried to seize US$76 million in assets recovered from the liquidation of Eurofed Bank, Ltd.  This was despite the fact that the vast majority of these assets belonged to legitimate depositors.

Enacting stringent asset protection and privacy laws means little if a culture of plunder permeates the jurisdiction where they're passed.  Unfortunately, that appears to be the situation in Antigua.  Until the government demonstrates that it intends to protect the rights of property owners, how can anyone take Antigua's asset protection laws seriously?

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann, LL.M.

Feds Shut Down Precious Metal Backed Alternative Currency

Yesterday, Nov. 14, federal agents raided the offices of "Liberty Dollar" in Evansville, Indiana, and confiscated all its property and equipment.

The Liberty Dollar is a privately circulating currency backed by gold and silver.  There are various forms of Liberty Dollars, but the most popular one is a one-ounce round silver medallion.

Liberty Dollars are produced by the National Organization for the Repeal of the Federal Reserve Act and the Internal Revenue Code (NORFED).  Led by economist Bernard Nothaus, NORFED has long been a thorn in the side of the federal government. 

And now, the feds are getting their revenge.

There is little question that the production, sale, and possession of Liberty Dollars are legal.  Indeed, in 1999, the Treasury Department's legal team reviewed the Liberty Dollar.  Claudia Dickens, spokeswoman for the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Engraving and Printing, said:

"There's nothing illegal about this.  As long as it doesn't say legal tender there's nothing wrong with it."

That, apparently, is the rub.  "Legal tender," in essence, means that a particular form of money must be accepted for all debts. 

NORFED has never claimed that Liberty Dollars are legal tender.  However, in recent years, the company built up a network of "Liberty merchants" who accept Liberty Dollars in exchange for goods and services.  And since the U.S. Department of Justice says that federal legal tender laws prohibit the use of privately circulated gold or silver coins intended for use as money, that may have been what led to yesterday's raid on NORFED. 

Pursuant to U.S. civil forfeiture laws, the feds seized everything NORFED owns.  All their gold.  All their silver.  All their platinum.  All their bank accounts.  All their cash.  All their computers.  Even the dies for minting the coins they produce.

Uncle Sam doesn't want any competition in the money business.  All forms of currency deemed legal tender by the feds—Federal Reserve Notes and coins produced by the U.S. Mint—are all totally debased.  They're backed only by the American dream, and not by gold, silver, or any other commodity.  The 30% decline in the international value of the U.S. dollar in recent years is only the most visible sign of this debasement.

Today's raid will hardly end the hunger of Americans to possess "real money."  But it may well spell the end of NORFED. 

Fortunately, there are many other ways to purchase gold and silver.  U.S. gold and silver eagles, produced by the U.S. mint, are unquestionably legal to buy and sell.  If you don't want to take physical possession of precious metals, you can purchase them through organizations such as GoldMoney or the Perth Mint Certificate program.

Just don't make any claim that real money backed by gold or silver is legal tender for any debt.  Otherwise, the feds might shut you down, too.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

Judge Loses His $54 Million Trousers…and His Job

A $54 million lawsuit for a missing pair of pants has led to the dismissal of an administrative law judge in Washington, D.C.

In 2005, Judge Roy Pearson, who I wrote about in a previous blog entry, brought five suits to a dry cleaning service Soo and Jin Chung owned.  The Chungs apparently lost the pants to one of the suits.  In response, Pearson filed a whopping $67 million lawsuit, which he later reduced to $54 million.

Despite almost universal condemnation, Pearson soldiered on in a one-man quest to make the Chungs accountable for losing his pants.  He calculated his losses by adding up years of the Chung's alleged legal violations and $2 million in fraud claims.  Pearson also asked the court to award him legal fees amounting to $546,000, even though he represented himself.

After losing the lawsuit, Pearson appealed to the Washington D.C. Court of Appeals to have the decision reconsidered.  The appeal is pending.

On May 2, 2007, Judge Pearson's tenure as a judge expired.  And, perhaps in response to the unfavorable publicity the lawsuit brought upon the city, the Washington D.C. Commission on Selection and Tenure of Administrative Law Judges declined to reappoint him.

In the meantime, the Chungs closed the shop involved in the dispute.  At one point, they even considered moving back to South Korea, where Mr. Chung once worked in a charcoal factory.  With their legal fees over $100,000, and mounting daily, their plight is a textbook case for asset protection planning. 

If someone like the former Judge Pearson ever sues you, you'll wish you had a "financial fortress" in place that can't be touched, even if you lose.  And there are plenty of options open to you—read more about them here.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

Hushmail Spills Secrets to Feds

Sending an ordinary e-mail to someone is like sending that person a postcard.  It's easy to read the message at any point along the electronic chain over which the message travels.

The only way to protect the privacy of the message is to encrypt it.  Encryption scrambles the message using mathematical formulas that make it unreadable.  Only someone possessing the correct "key" can convert the message back to readable text.

Numerous companies (e.g., PGP) have developed programs to allow PC users to send and receive encrypted e-mails.  The best of these programs provide protection so strong that even the super-computers used by national intelligence agencies can't decipher messages created with them.

But learning to use these programs requires some effort.  It also requires a little additional time to encrypt or decrypt a message.  As a result, most PC users don't bother to encrypt their e-mail. 

To make using encryption easier, in 1999, a Canadian company introduced a revolutionary service to make sending and receiving encrypted e-mail easier and faster.  Hushmail allows users to encrypt their e-mail messages through a Web-based interface similar to Yahoo! or Hotmail e-mail. 

And it's not modest about its capabilities.  It claims "not even a Hushmail employee with access to our servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer."  Only, it turns out that this isn't necessarily true if a government agency wants to read your e-mail. 

In 2006, acting through the U.S.-Canada Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), U.S. prosecutors requested copies of decrypted, "plain text" e-mails from alleged steroid dealers.   Subsequently, in response to a Canadian court order, Hushmail turned over 12 CDs of plain-text e-mail messages to U.S. investigators.

It turns out that the only way that Hushmail could comply with the order was to exploit a vulnerability in the way it encrypts messages.  Fortunately, the vulnerability only affects a relatively new offering from Hushmail that doesn't require users to load and run a program called Java.

Loading a Java "applet" takes a few seconds and delays access to a Hushmail account.  So, in 2006, Hushmail developed a service that didn't require loading the applet.  But, this introduced the vulnerability into the Hushmail service.

In the new service, instead of the encryption occurring on your PC, it occurs in Hushmail's servers.  This requires that Hushmail briefly retain a copy of your "passphrase"—the string of characters you type in to authenticate yourself as the legitimate owner of your account.  Someone with access to Hushmail's servers can get at the passphrase and thus all of the messages in the account. 

Again, this vulnerability only affects Hushmail's newer, non-Java-based system.  If you don't mind waiting a few seconds for the Java applet to load when you log on to Hushmail, the company doesn't have a copy of your passphrase.

[UPDATE 11/20/07: Hushmail now admits that the Java-based system may also be compromised in response to a court order.]

Is waiting a few extra seconds worth the sacrifice?  Only you can decide that question, but if you value your privacy, the answer is an unequivocal "yes."

Click here to learn hundreds more ways you can protect your privacy and wealth, on or off the Internet.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

Antigua: Confiscation of Foreign Property is Official Policy

It’s now official.  The government of Antigua and Barbuda has what it considers “official” permission to confiscate a US$60 million resort.

The Half Moon Bay Resort sits on one of the most beautiful beaches in the Caribbean.  It’s justifiably famous for its pink sand.  A consortium of U.S., Canadian, and British investors, owns, or used to own, the resort.

Over the past 35 years, their company, H.M.B. Holdings Ltd., invested millions of dollars in the resort.  However, the Antiguan government has long coveted the property.  And in 2005, the Attorney General secretly transferred title from H.M.B. Holdings to the government.

The Attorney General called this action “expropriation,” not “confiscation.”  However, owners of expropriated property receive some form of compensation.  But the Antiguan government offered no compensation to H.M.B. Holdings.

H.M.B. Holdings unsuccessfully contested the seizure in the local courts.  Eventually, the company lodged an appeal before the Privy Council in London, Antigua’s highest court. In June 2007, the Privy Council declared the expropriation legal, but only if the government paid fair and adequate compensation.

The Antiguan government now claims that this decision provides judicial sanction for its actions.  Yet, it has never offered to purchase the property.  Nor has it offered H.M.B. Holdings a single dollar in compensation.

The confiscation of the resort is only one initiative to discourage foreign ownership of real property in Antigua.  Foreign investors in Antiguan real estate must obtain government permission—a license—to purchase it.  Foreign shareholders of companies owning land there must obtain individual land-holding licenses. 

Investors foolish enough to develop property must also obtain approval from the newly established Antigua and Barbuda Investment Authority.  This agency is empowered to dispense waivers and concessions to encourage politically favored developers.

The Half Moon Bay Resort debacle is only the latest chapter in Antigua’s sordid treatment of foreign investors.  In 2001, the government tried to seize US$76 million in assets recovered from the liquidation of Eurofed Bank, Ltd.  This was despite the fact that the vast majority of these assets belonged to legitimate depositors.

At the time, one Eurofed depositor asked, “What sort of message does this send out to foreigners who are doing business or contemplating doing business with Antigua's offshore sector?"

The message is quite clear.  The Antiguan government, and its representatives, are the new Pirates of the Caribbean. Invest or do business there at your peril.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann

How Safe is Your Offshore Cash Stash?

One of the most interesting offshore opportunities isn't an investment.  It's merely keeping valuables—or valuable records—in an offshore safety deposit box or private vault.

This strategy has several advantages.  The most important one is that the valuables are outside your domestic jurisdiction.  If someone has a judgment against you, the assets are effectively out-of-reach. 

For Americans, another advantage is that these assets aren't reportable as a "foreign bank, securities, or 'other' financial account."  That means you don't need to tell the IRS or U.S. Treasury about them.  However, if you have a bank account at the offshore bank where you have the safety deposit box, that account—although not the box—is reportable.

Without mandatory IRS or Treasury reporting, your valuables are essentially invisible.  They won't show up in a domestic asset search.  And an investigator will have a very tough time trying to find them offshore.  With a large enough budget, he might eventually find the foreign bank or vault where you've stashed your valuables.  But even then, he won't be able to find out what you keep in your box.

There is one possible exception.  In a criminal investigation, the government may be able to get its hands on the assets in your offshore safety deposit box or private vault.  Using what's called a "Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty," or MLAT, the U.S. Department of Justice (or equivalent agency in your country) can enlist the assistance of police in another country. 

However, MLATs are used only in investigations of serious crimes.  If you're not doing anything illegal, it's very likely your offshore safety deposit box or private vault rental will remain private.  And, your valuables will remain secure until you need to reclaim them.

Copyright © 2007 by Mark Nestmann